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 Environmental Regulations and Livestock Production Levels:  





Fundamental to the assertion that environmental regulatory standards are strategically set 
by decentralized authorities and consequently firms respond to spatial differences in 
regulatory standards is the underline causal relationship. Establishing the cause-effect 
association between regulatory standard setting and industry response is essential to 
justify the existence of the pollution haven and the potential for a race to the bottom.  In 
this paper using 25 years data of the livestock production intensities for hog, dairy and 
fed cattle sectors and environmental regulatory stringency measure from 1975 to 2000 for 
48 contiguous states we explore whether the direction of causality as suggested by race to 
the bottom hypothesis is in fact supported by the empirical evidence and hence the 
potential for existence of pollution haven is real in the U.S. livestock production sector.  
The results in general support the existence of pollution havens and potential for a race to 
the bottom at the regional level.  There were no convincing evidences supporting the 
reserve causality that the “industry driving policy” hypothesis.  Across the different 
livestock types, dairy sector provided conclusive evidence that in the regions with 
substantial growth of dairy inventories, there are strong evidences for a race to the 
bottom. 
 




Location choices of livestock operation have been examined focusing on the 
variation of environmental regulatory stringency among states in the U.S. (Park, Seidl 
and Davies, Roe, Irwin, and Sharp; Metcalfe, 2001; Mo and Abdalla; Osei and 
Luxminarayan; Herath, Weersink and Carpentier).  The inquiry of association between 
location choices and environmental regulations for livestock producers is a branch of a 
broader research thrust in the trade and environment literature involving pollution haven 
hypothesis (see for example, Bridsall and Wheeler, 1993; Jensen, 1996; Eskeland and 
Harrison, 1997; Neumayer, 2001; Millimet and List, 2004; Frankel and Rose, 2005).  The pollution haven hypothesis asserts that polluting firms will locate in regions with the 
laxest environmental regulations in order to avoid the costs of abatement (Levinson, 
1999; Millimet and List, 2004; Scott, 2004).  Support of the hypothesis implies that 
regional differences in the stringency of environmental legislation will result in a race to 
the bottom for those laws in order to attract firms into an area (Bartick 1988; Levinson 
1996; Becker and Henderson, 2000).  For example, Fredriksson and Millimet (2002) 
suggest a strategic interaction exists between the stringency of environmental regulations 
of both contiguous and regional neighbors operating within a five year window.   
Race to the bottom hypothesis suggests a proactive policy making where state 
policies have been put in place in anticipation of the favorable reaction from the large 
livestock operators in their location choices (Park, Seidl and Davies).  For instance, 
Martin and Zering argue that large-scale intensive pork production has shifted to southern 
states such as North Carolina and Arkansas because "environmental regulations, zoning 
regulations, and anti-corporate farming regulations did not present insurmountable 
barriers to siting and building production units and processing plants in the region" 
(p.49).  Fundamental to the assertion that regulatory standards are strategically set by 
decentralized authorities and consequently firms respond to spatial differences in 
regulatory standards is the underline causal relationship.  Establishing the cause-effect 
association between regulatory standard setting and industry response is essential to 
justify the existence of the pollution haven and the potential for a race to the bottom.  The 
direction of causality has significant policy implications for those concerned about the 
environmental impacts from CAFOs.  If different levels of regulatory stringency 
significantly affect the dynamics of the spatial distribution of livestock production, then there is preliminary support for the pollution haven hypothesis.  CAFOs may be moving 
to states with lenient environmental regulations and the potential race to the bottom 
implies a need for federal level environmental policy regulations.  On the other hand, if 
livestock numbers determine environmental regulations, there will be no competition 
among states to attract capital and growth opportunities associated with livestock 
operations.  Local regulations are thus appropriate to handle potential local issues with 
the livestock sector and federal regulation is unnecessary.  Despite the significance of the 
implications for general environmental policies through active stake holder participation 
in shaping the regulatory outcome as suggested by capture theory, surprisingly the 
direction of causality issue is largely unexplored in the pollution haven literature in the 
livestock sector.  The purpose of this study is to test the direction of causality between the 
stringency of environmental regulations facing animal operations and the intensity of 
livestock production for the US hog, dairy and fed-cattle sectors.  In this paper we 
explore whether the direction of causality as suggested by race to the bottom hypothesis 
is in fact supported by the empirical evidence and hence the potential for existence of 
pollution haven is real in the U.S. livestock production sector.  We have used 25 years 
data of the livestock production intensities for hog, dairy and fed cattle sectors and 
environmental regulatory stringency measure from 1975 to 2000 for 48 contiguous states.  
We tested the direction of causality using panel data specification of the Granger 
causality test for these two variables at the 8 Census regions.  The paper contributes to 
the literature related to pollution haven hypothesis in livestock sector by testing not only 
the existence of causal relationship between livestock production intensities and 
environmental regulatory stringency but the direction of causality as well.  
Direction of causality “chicken or egg”  
Researchers acknowledge that livestock location choices are determined not only 
by regulatory stringency but also by input availability and prices, output prices, physical 
and climatic conditions, and management and technology access.  However, perfection of 
the intensive livestock farming in a more controlled environment, better disease and 
feeding management systems and lower transportation costs have increasingly weaken 
the geographical comparative advantage of feed availability and climatic suitability in 
location choices (Abdalla, et al 1995).  Therefore,  institutional variables such as 
regulatory stringency, anti-corporate farming laws, affinity with contract farming and 
other sociopolitical characteristics of the constituent have been brought into explain the 
recent changes in the spatial dynamics of livestock operations in the U.S. (Roe et al; 
Drabenstott; Sumner and Wolf; Stretesky et al; Jackson-Smith and Buttel).  If there is 
little regional comparative advantage from climatic conditions or other technological 
factors, the institutional variables are likely to play a bigger role especially in the 
proactive public policy making.  For instance, if regional and st5ate governments really 
do engage in a race to the bottom, certain regions would have an inefficiently high 
number of concentrated animal feeding operations (CAFOs).  Because the assimilative 
capacity of the environment is deliberately undervalued in a region where a race to the 
bottom has occurred, the heavier concentration of livestock operations in that region may 
pollute at a level that is higher than the socially optimal level, and at a greater cost to 
society.  On the contrary, if pollution control costs are significant and vary across 
geographical locations due to reasons other than regulatory stringency such as industry agglomeration effects and availability and supply of inputs for pollution control services, 
some regions may have a comparative advantage of providing pollution control services 
(but not on the livestock production).  Thus the implicit assumption of treating regulatory 
stringency equivalent to cost of pollution control as poised in the pollution haven 
hypothesis is untenable if such comparative advantage of pollution control exists 
(Neumayer, 2001).  The validity of such alternative hypothesis of spatial dynamics of 
livestock operations has been largely unexplored in the literature.   
  The potential existence of pollution havens resulting from decentralized policy 
making was a partial impetus behind the creation of the US Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) in 1968 (House Report 1979) and the reason why the US Clean Air Act is 
implemented at the federal level (Revesz 1992).  However, pollution control in the US is 
generally a combination of centralized standard-setting and state-level implementation 
and enforcement.  A disparity in regulatory stringency among states arose in the 1980s 
when the federal government delegated the function of devising their own regulatory 
regimes to state authorities (Kraft and Vig; Lester; Levinson, 2000).  Consequently, a 
state retains considerable flexibility in their environmental policy making.  For example, 
Clean Air Act and Clean Water act grants considerable latitude in selecting methods of 
pollution control at the state level facilitating the free riding behavior (Holmes et al., 
1993).  Differences in environmental regulations at the state-level may explain the spatial 
differences in livestock numbers over time.  Inventory has increased in non-traditional 
producing regions particularly for the hog sector.  The increased concentration of animal 
feeding operations has been linked to the growth of nearby processing facilities (Abdalla 
et al., 1995).  However, the changes may be a reflection of pollution havens arising.  While Metcalfe (2000) found environmental regulations to have an inconclusive effect on 
location decisions for the hog sector, Osei and Lakshiminarayan (1996) found higher 
environmental regulations deterred the decision to site dairies.  Herath et al. (2005) also 
found that differences in the severity of environmental legislation affected inventory 
numbers for the dairy and hog sectors.   
The pollution haven hypothesis assumes that lax (stringent) environmental laws 
cause an increase (a decrease) in the number of polluting firms to a region.  However, 
thedirection of causality may be reversed or may be the change in environmental laws 
and change in number of polluting firms are determined simultaneously.  Political 
economy theory suggests that the severity of environmental regulation is not exogenous 
but rather endogenously determined through the lobbying efforts of affected stakeholders   
(Pashigian, 1985).  For example, regulations directed toward the livestock sector would 
not normally be considered until pollution problems attributable to animal operations 
arose.  On one hand existing livestock farms would have the incentive to lobby 
government representatives to minimize the financial impact to their operations of any 
proposed legislation.  On the other hand, these efforts may be countered by pressures 
from non-farm groups seeking to limit the growth of confined animal feeding operations 
(CAFOs).  Either way, the environmental regulations facing the sector are determined by 
factors such as livestock production numbers rather than being exogenously determined 
and thereby altering inventory levels as suggested by the pollution haven hypothesis. 
 
Econometric Specification We test for Granger causality between two variables: environmental regulatory 
stringency index and livestock inventories for hog, dairy and fed-cattle using a panel data 
approach.  The panel data approach permits the use of both cross-sectional and time 
series information to test the causality relationship between two variables.  The 
substantial increase of number of observation raises the degrees of freedom thereby 
improves the efficiency of Granger causality test.  The notion of Granger causality is 
based on a criterion of incremental forecasting value. Variable X is said to be “Granger 
cause” variable Y if Y can be better predicted from the past values of the X and Y 
variables together than the past values of Y alone (Granger, 1969).  In assessing causality, 
social scientists often posit the exogeneity of certain variables on the basis of a priori 
reasoning. However, if these variables are not, in fact, exogenous, the conditions for 
identification will be misstated and parameter estimates will not be consistent. According 
to Sims (1972) a necessary condition for a variable to be exogenous to another variable is 
that the second variable fails to Granger cause first variable. In other words by testing for 
Granger causality, it is possible to refute claims of econometric exogeneity. 
There are many ways that the Granger causality can be operationalized for the 
simplest bivariate case (see Freeman, 1983). This study tests for the direction of causality 
using a Granger causality test procedure modified by Hurlin and Vent (2001) to handle 
panel data and this method has been employed recently by Hoffman et al. (2005).  First 
we test for the existence of causality.  Consider a time-stationary VAR representation, 
adapted to a panel data context.  Let i denotes the state and t denotes the time period of 





where INVi,t is the level of inventory for the i
th state in the t
th year (inventory could be 
hog, dairy or fed-cattle in thousand heads), ERSi,t is the index of the environmental 
regulatory stringency for the i
th state in the t
th year and δi,t is the error term.  The lag 
structure for the variable INV is characterized by γ
(k) for the k
th lag and the lag structure 
for the ERS is characterized by β
(k) for the k
th lag.  On the other hand if environmental 
regulatory stringency has been caused by the level of livestock inventories the reverse 




two specifications were also estimated separately for the 8 Census regions.   The 
breakdown of the 48 states across 8 regions is in Appendix II.  
In the Granger causality testing first the null hypothesis of no causal relationship 
is tested as shown below.  
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−If the null hypothesis is rejected, then there is evidence of a causal relationship 
between livestock inventories and environmental regulation.  Second, given that the null 
hypothesis is rejected, Granger causality analysis is conducted to determine the direction 
of the causality.  The test statistics can be computed by the following Wald test as 
proposed by Hurlin and Venet (2001). 
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Where SN denotes the total number of observations, RRSS denotes the restricted 
residual sum of squares obtained under the null hypothesis and URRSS is the unrestricted 
residual sum of squares obtained from equation 1 and 2.       
 
Data 
Environmental stringency regulation index has been developed by Herath et al. (2005) 
and the index provides the panel data on the regulatory stringency for 48 contiguous U.S. 
states from 1975 to 2000 and state level livestock inventories were taken from the NASS 
website of the USDA for the same period. In total, 1200 observations were available for 
the analysis.  The stationarity of the two variables should be tested in order to avoid 
improper causal effect attributable to the serial correlation.  Augmented Dickey-Fuller 
test was used to test for the unit roots of panel values of inventories (hog, dairy and fed-
cattle) and panel values of environmental regulatory stringency.  The levels of two 
variables found to have no unit roots thus found to be stationary. 
 Results of the Granger Causality Test 
The causality test results for the entire 48 states along with different lag structures are 
reported in Table 1.  The F statistics for the Wald test with the significant levels 95% or 
greater have been reported with a star.  In the second column for the lag values, first 
value indicates number of lags for the dependent variable and second value indicates 
numbers of lags for the independent variable.  First nine rows of the Table 1 report 
whether environmental regulatory stringency Granger cause livestock inventory levels 
while the second nine rows report whether livestock inventory levels Granger cause 
environmental regulatory stringency.  The direction of causality could be either way at 
the national level and results are inconclusive and no appreciable differences were found 
across type of livestock operations.  Across the lag structures, significant F values for 
rejecting null hypothesis of no causal relationship is equally likely for the both directions.  
These results are not surprising since that it is unlikely to have homogeneous causal 
relationship between environmental regulatory stringency and livestock inventory level at 
national level.  Heterogeneity among the states is abound especially due to the 
sociopolitical traits of the population and their reactions to environmental nuisances and 
the lobbying power for influencing environmental regulatory outcomes.  The state level 
heterogeneity could be controlled to some extent by grouping the states in to more 
comparable classes.  In order to address the potential heterogeneity of the states, we have 
estimated the above models separately for the 8 Census regions and detailed results are 
reported in Appendix 2 and summary results are in Table 2.   
Albeit the direction of causality is ambiguous at the region levels too, some 
interesting patterns are emerging from the results reported in Table2.  Only a very few regions provided the evidence for the reverse causality (inventory level Granger causing 
environmental regulatory stringency).  Hog sector seems to be the most likeliest to have 
such a reverse causal relationship given that the general revulsion for the mega hog farms 
among most stakeholders.  However, we have not found any evidence for such a reverse 
causal association between hog inventories and environmental regulatory stringency at 
any of the 8 census regions.  Therefore the empirical evidence for “industry driving 
policy” hypothesis is weak in the hog sector.  Populated regions such as New England (in 
dairy) and Far west (in fed-cattle) seems to provide evidence for the existence of reverse 
causality (inventory level Granger causing environmental regulatory stringency).   
However, we cannot comment about these regional characteristics steadfastly since New 
England and Far West seems to have opposite causal relationship in Hog and Fed-cattle 
sectors.  However, in general, evidence for pollution haven hypothesis is found in many 
of the regions.  Environmental regulatory stringency Granger cause hog inventories in 
New England, Great Plains and Far West, dairy inventories in Mid east Great Lakes, 
South West, Rocky Mountains, and Fed-cattle inventories in New England and South 
west.  There are two potential explanations for the evidence for pollution haven 
hypothesis in these regions.  New England, Mid East and Far west regions are likely to 
have stringent environmental regulatory regimes mainly due to population density and 
the prominence of non-agricultural industrial growth in the industrialization of U.S. 
economy.  Thus stringent regulatory regimes are likely to be in place to combat the 
pollution generated from such industrial activities and polluting firms with livestock 
production seem to face similar stringent measures in such regions.  In contrary, 
Southwest and Rocky Mountains have been noted as the “new home” for livestock operators especially during the recent past.  Especially, states such as Oklahoma, 
Colorado, Utah, and Idaho have experienced substantial growth in livestock inventories.  
Among such states, it is likely that entering large livestock operators searching for the 
states with less stringent regulatory regimes in such regions.  For instance dairy 
inventories have been increased in Mideast by 1413%, in Great Lake by 2171%, in 
Southwest by 594%, and in Rocky Mountain by 557% from 1975 to 2000.  It is plausible 
that such substantial increase in livestock inventories are responding to regulatory 
stringencies strategically by searching for pollution havens among the states.  Leniently 
regulated states in these regions are likely to house a disproportionately larger share of 
expanding livestock inventories hence providing the evidence for pollution haven 
hypothesis.  A similar observation is reported for the fed-cattle inventory growth in 
Southwest (85%).   A precautionary remark is due given the nature of the mixed results.  
Many of the regions also reported situations of causality in both directions, yet these 
results are across different livestock types.  While there are reasons to believe that across 
different livestock species environmental regulatory stringency likely to play a different 
role, in general across all the livestock types the results are more incline to be supportive 
for pollution haven hypothesis and potential for the race to the bottom.  
 
Conclusions 
This paper estimated the Granger causality test for livestock inventories (hog, dairy and 
fed-cattle sectors), and environmental regulatory stringency in the United States for the 
period of 1975 to 2000 using 48 contiguous states.  The results in general support the 
existence of pollution havens and potential for a race to the bottom at the regional level.  There were no convincing evidences supporting the reserve causality that the “industry 
driving policy” hypothesis.  Across the different livestock types, dairy sector provided 
conclusive evidence that in the regions with substantial growth of dairy inventories there 
are strong evidence for a race to the bottom.             
       
  
 Table 1.  Granger causality for environment regulatory stringency and livestock  
      inventories at the national level (for 48 states) 
 
Direction of Causality  Lags   Hog  Dairy  Cattle 
ESR→INVT 2-2  2.23  0.56  2.06 
 2-3  3.86*  8.27*  44.97* 
 2-4  24.65*  9.55*  54.65* 
 3-2  2.49  0.68  1.50 
 3-3  1.72  1.51  1.01 
 3-4  21.28*  4.39*  20.76* 
 4-2  2.39  0.52  1.65 
 4-3  1.63  1.75  1.17 
 4-4  1.47  1.71  1.00 
INVT→ESR 2-2  1.81  0.56  1.93 
 2-3  9.76*  8.50*  9.43* 
 2-4  19.54*  18.42*  18.97* 
 3-2  1.67  0.36  1.99 
 3-3  1.78  0.49  1.46 
 3-4  13.84*  12.56*  13.14* 
 4-2  0.83  0.19  1.65 
 4-3  1.07  0.28  1.22 
   4-4  1.39  0.25  0.92 
  
Table 2.  Granger causality for environment regulatory stringency and livestock  
      inventories at the regional level (for 8 Census Regiona) 
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Appendix 1.Regional Inventories of Hogs, Dairy and Fed Cattle in US, 2000 (‘000s)) 
 
Region State 
New England  Connecticut 
 Maine 
 Massachusetts 
 New  Hampshire 




 New  Jersey 
 New  York 
 Pennsylvania 










 North  Dakota 








 North  Carolina 
 South  Carolina 
 Tennessee 
 Virginia 
 West  Virginia 
Southwest Arizona 
 New  Mexico 
 Oklahoma 
 Texas 









 Source: USDA, NASS 
 
 
 Appendix II.  Regional level Granger Causality test 
 





Structure Hog Dairy  Cattle 
New England  ESR→INVT 2-3  5.37*  1.03  2.99*
 ESR→INVT 2-4  13.21***  1.13  2.91*
 ESR→INVT 3-4  11.11***  1.06  2.04
 INVT→ESR  2-3  1.62 3.01* 2.00
 INVT→ESR  2-4  1.64 3.00* 2.09
Mideast ESR→INVT 2-2  0.08  1.89  4.87*
 ESR→INVT 2-3  0.51  4.50*  6.93*
 ESR→INVT 2-4  0.88  3.95*  5.79*
 ESR→INVT 3-2  0.02  1.89  4.93*
 ESR→INVT 3-3  0.02  1.72  4.23*
 ESR→INVT 3-4  1.71  1.88  3.80*
 ESR→INVT 4-2  0.02  1.80  3.92*
 ESR→INVT 4-3  0.02  1.74  3.60*
 ESR→INVT 4-4  0.12  1.52  2.86*
 INVT→ESR 2-2  0.51  0.59  4.17*
 INVT→ESR 2-3  0.53  2.49  5.26*
 INVT→ESR 2-4  1.33  2.41  4.31*
 INVT→ESR 3-2  0.44  0.55  4.04*
Great Lakes  ESR→INVT 2-2  0.47  1.54  6.30***
 ESR→INVT 2-3  4.60*  4.07*  9.93*
 ESR→INVT 2-4  9.16***  8.43***  7.39***
 ESR→INVT 3-2  0.70  1.06  7.30***
 ESR→INVT 3-3  0.47  0.74  9.88***
 ESR→INVT 3-4  5.58*  5.42*  7.78***
 ESR→INVT 4-2  1.58  0.52  4.85**
 ESR→INVT 4-3  1.05  0.48  7.67***
 ESR→INVT 4-4  0.85  0.37  6.12***
 INVT→ESR 2-2  0.71  0.45  4.79**
 INVT→ESR 2-3  6.91***  2.15  7.99***
 INVT→ESR 2-4  5.37**  2.03  6.58***
 INVT→ESR 3-2  0.67  0.33  7.22***
 INVT→ESR 3-3  5.08**  0.52  7.63***
 INVT→ESR 3-4  4.06**  0.88  6.53***
 INVT→ESR 4-2  0.30  0.17  6.39***
 INVT→ESR 4-3  6.51***  0.33  6.39***
 INVT→ESR 4-4  5.13**  0.25  5.05**
Great Plains  ESR→INVT 2-4  7.31***  2.89*  7.76***
 ESR→INVT 3-4  6.42*  1.98  6.43*** INVT→ESR  2-3  0.68 2.96* 1.95
 INVT→ESR  2-4  0.93 10.87* 8.00*
 INVT→ESR 3-4  0.49  9.63*  6.65*
 INVT→ESR  4-4  0.03 2.68* 0.61
Southeast ESR→INVT  2-2  0.19 3.28* 0.78
 ESR→INVT 2-3  1.69  34.14*  2.01
 ESR→INVT  2-4  6.56*** 54.76*** 7.84***
 ESR→INVT  3-4  5.76** 24.59*** 6.92***
 INVT→ESR 2-3  4.84**  2.31  2.67*
 INVT→ESR 2-4  8.86***  8.32**  7.94***
 INVT→ESR 3-3  3.14*  0.79  1.17
 INVT→ESR 3-4  7.53***  7.28***  7.10***
 INVT→ESR 4-3  3.00*  0.69  1.16
 INVT→ESR 4-4  4.10**  0.91  0.87
Southwest ESR→INVT  2-3  1.58 9.55* 2.13
 ESR→INVT 2-4  1.83  13.18*  3.20
 ESR→INVT 3-4  1.19  6.00***  2.69*
 ESR→INVT  4-3  0.81 3.61* 1.42
 ESR→INVT  4-4  0.88 4.16* 1.91
Rocky Mountain  ESR→INVT  2-3  0.43 5.79* 0.68
 ESR→INVT  2-4  1.94 4.51* 0.93
Far West  ESR→INVT  2-3  2.31 6.90* 0.99
 ESR→INVT 2-4  3.06*  7.62***  1.17
 INVT→ESR 2-3  1.65  3.42*  3.46*
 INVT→ESR  2-4  1.58 2.69* 2.51
 INVT→ESR  3-2  2.51 3.61* 2.59
   INVT→ESR  3-3  2.52 2.94* 2.45
•  Significant at 5% significant level. 
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